Source: newindianexpress.com
The role of the Chief Justice of India, judges of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of the High Court vis-a-vis the administration of the National Law Universities (NLUs) is deeply intertwined. The reason is simple. The Chief Justice of India is the chancellor of NLUs of Bangalore and Kolkata. Two Judges of Supreme Court are Chancellors of NLUs established in Mumbai, Aurangabad and Nagpur and others NLUs are headed by Chief Justices of High Courts as Chancellors. This excludes the case of NLU Lucknow and NLU Rai, Sonipat whose Chancellors are the chief minister of the state and the governor of the state respectively.
However, the role of Chancellor Judges sometimes coincides with the issue of judicial propriety. This happens when such Chancellor Judges discharge administrative function vis-a-vis NLUs on one hand and simultaneously also adjudicate over matters concerning these NLUs and their office bearers in the court. Such that, whether the cases filed against the NLUs be at all listed before the Bench of the Chief Justice in a High Court who is also the Chancellor of the same University? Whether the case in the Supreme Court concerning matters of NLU in any respect be at all listed either before the Chief Justice of India or any judge who is the Chancellor of any NLU? Should the cases which are filed involving the Vice Chancellors or Registrars of NLUs be similarly heard by such Chancellor Judge who is also the appointing authority of the Vice Chancellor in most of the NLUs?
Legally speaking, the judicial propriety
may demand that this should not happen. However, facts tell a different
story. To test this argument, lets us take two cases in which most of
the NLUs are or have been parties and a case where Chancellors
themselves or the Vice Chancellors and Registrars
“are parties and the case is directly related to their role in the administration of the University or the cause of action.
Foremost is the case of Varun Bhagat vs Union of India, W.P. No. (Civil) 68 of 2006, which paved the way for the ‘Common Law Admission Test’ (CLAT) when the then Vice Chancellors of first seven NLUs in the country formed the CLAT body. Interestingly, CLAT came into formation when the case was still sub-judice and it virtually rendered the petition infructuous. Be that as it may, CLAT came into existence. But the bench hearing this involved the then CJI who was the Chancellor of two of the respondent NLUs, namely NLSIU, Bangalore and NUJS, Kolkata.
The second important case is of Shamnad
Basheer vs Union of India & Others, W.P. (Civil) No. 600 of 2015.
This case was filed by the public spirited professor of law praying for
the establishment of the ‘National Testing Agency’ to regulate CLAT. The
case is still sub-judice. But it is once again being heard by a bench
presided by one of the judges who is also a serving Chancellor of two
NLUs.
The third important case is of the Orissa High Court, Penukanta Ota vs
State of Odisha, Secretary of Law, Chancellor of National Law University
Odisha & Others, W P (Civil) No. 9445 of 2018. The case is about
the administrative issues in NLU Odisha and was admitted on the basis of
the Public Interest Litigation. Interestingly, the matter is still
sub-judice and is regularly being heard by the bench headed by the Chief
Justice of Orissa. This makes it a very peculiar case of dubious
judicial propriety where the Chief Justice of the HC regularly presides
over a matter in which he is also listed as a respondent party and the
case is about the administrative problems in the University under his
direct control and administrative supervision.
How should we view the impartial role of the Chancellor Judges in these cases when they are regular visitors to such NLUs? This becomes all the more critical when the case is based on PIL about the serious administrative problems in NLU involving the role of the Vice Chancellor and the Chancellor Judge hears it during the day in the court and meets the same VC later accepting the hospitality. And the cycle continues. Should it not be viewed at par with any regular case where a Judge should refrain from accepting the hospitality of kind from either of the parties to a case before him?
Do these cases qualify for the prayer of recusal of the Chancellor Judges from such benches? Would it not be judicious in the first place for such judges to make a self-disclosure of their interest in the administration of NLUs and gracefully recuse from the bench? This would perhaps set a trend of high judicial propriety. In the matters otherwise, two-pronged simple approach can be relied upon by the Chancellor Judges to sound more fair, judicious and transparent in their approach. Firstly,that such cases can be listed before a bench of other Judges.
And secondly, while hearing a case related to NLUs, the responsibilities of a Chancellor could be delegated to another Judge until the case is disposed of and shall maintain a reasonable distance from University matters and the Vice Chancellors. Judicial propriety would then be better preserved and practiced. Crafting the contours of a judicial accountability is an ongoing journey and these case studies of NLUs must be seen as a fresh opportunity for more constructive debate that would help judiciary reassure that its actions, words, integrity and accountability are all subject to the test of the sovereign conscious and the Constitution
